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Compared with the wave of general strikes that have swept across Europe since 2009, the 
response of UK trade unions to the global financial crisis and government austerity 
measures has been rather more muted. However, in March 2011 there was the largest ever 
trade union protest demonstration in Britain’s history involving half a million workers, which 
was followed in November by a one-day public sector general strike of 2.5 million workers 
which represented the biggest industrial confrontation since the miners’ strike in 1984-5 
and the biggest single day of strike action in Britain since the 1926 General Strike. Although 
nowhere nearly as extensive or prolonged as Greek, Spanish or French-style union organised 
resistance, the rising levels of strike activity against austerity have led to an upsurge in 
membership levels for a number of unions combined with renewed levels of engagement 
and collective organisation (Labour Research, February 2012). 
Of course this recent spate of union militancy in Britain has occurred against a 
backcloth of many years of union decline and retreat on a much greater scale than 
elsewhere in Europe, the broad contours of which include: a decline in strike activity to its 
lowest ever historical levels; the steepest ever sustained decline in union membership and 
density levels, with union presence narrowly confined overwhelmingly in the public sector; a 
substantial fall in the coverage of collective bargaining and number of workplace union reps; 
and the hangover from the defeat of the miners’ strike 1984-5 which, combined with other 
defeats, has sapped workers’ confidence and willingness to fight. Such union decline and 
retreat has been driven by a complex interaction of factors, including unfavourable 
economic policies, hostile employment legislation (including the outlawing of strikes with 
political objectives), strengthening of employers’ power, and dramatic changes in the 
structure of employment and the composition of the labour force. As a result, many 
commentators have long assumed the prospects for UK union renewal are bleak, with 
apparently insurmountable challenges providing little reason to imagine there will be any 
revival of fortunes (Gospel; 2005; Metcalf, 2005; Mcllroy and Daniels, 2009; Simms and 
Charlwood, 2010; Mcllroy, 2011). 
 But arguably, apart from the unfavourable context confronting UK unions, an 
important, if often downplayed, part of the problem has also been the limitations of their 
own strategic leadership approach towards union organising, as well as their enfeebled 
industrial and political response towards neoliberal globalisation. Ironically in the early 
2000s growing membership disaffection with the hesitant and often accommodative 
response of union leaders towards employers and the New Labour government stimulated 
the election of a new generation of so-called ‘awkward squad’ leaders. Yet despite a more 
critical stance only a small minority of this new intake have advocated industrial militancy 
and anti-capitalist and radical socialist solutions to neo-liberalism and the debt crisis. By 
contrast the pessimism of most Trades Union Congress (TUC) leaders as to whether the 
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unions are capable of fighting and winning has been exacerbated by an inability to present 
an effective ideological and political challenge to coalition government attacks combined 
with a continuing allegiance to a Labour Party which accepts many of the basic assumptions 
underlying the austerity measures. 
It required the combination of two powerful pressures to provoke conventionally 
conciliatory leaders to join with their more radical counterparts, albeit reluctantly, in 
organising large scale strike action: first, from above, by the sheer scale of the coalition 
government’s austerity offensive on their members’ pay, conditions and jobs in the public 
sector (with its inherent threat to seriously erode even further the unions’ membership 
base), combined with the government’s belligerent refusal to compromise; and second, 
from below, with an evident growing readiness by rank-and-file union members at the 
frontline of the cuts agenda to engage in militant resistance, along with the growing 
influence of radical left-wing forces within some unions. Nonetheless, the hesitancy of most 
union leaders has remained an important factor in the equation contributing to the relative 
much lower levels of strike activity against austerity in the UK compared with other 
European countries. 
One example of the alternative minority radical union trend has been the Public 
Service and Commercial Union (PCS) headed by its left-wing general secretary Mark 
Serwotka and within which a Left Unity grouping has exercised considerable influence at 
every level of the union. Thus in recent years the PCS has organised a series of sectoral and 
national strikes within the civil service in opposition to respective New Labour and coalition 
governments’ attacks on pensions, wages and jobs, combined with a left-wing programme 
calling for increased expenditure, extensive nationalisation and redistributive taxation. But 
arguably the experience of the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers 
(RMT), probably Britain’s most strike-prone union, has provided the deepest, sharpest and 
most vivid illustration of this minority radical unionism trend within the UK in recent years. 
In many respects the RMT, which represents the majority of the UK’s railway and 
London Underground workers, can be seen to fit within Kelly’s (1996) definition of ‘union 
militancy’ based on ambitious demands of scale and scope, the frequent threat/use of 
industrial action, and an ideology of conflicting interests between employers and workers. 
But in the process, the RMT, like PCS, also clearly has identifiable left-wing political features 
which have contributed to its industrial militancy. It has combined the repetitive 
mobilisation of members through strike action with vigorous left-wing ideological 
opposition to employers and government and a politically engaged form of left-wing trade 
unionism which attempts to link workplace issues to broader social and political concerns. In 
the process, the union’s general secretary, Bob Crow, has been at the forefront of calling for 
a militant response to the ‘class warfare’ of the coalition government, ‘a government of the 
ruling class and for the ruling class’, with ‘generalised’ strike action across the public and 
private sectors in defence of jobs, living standards and public services, alongside the 
outright rejection of neoliberalism, a campaign against EU deregulation and privatisation, 
and the re-nationalisation of the UK rail industry. 
Therefore in examining the RMT’s militant and left-wing political model of trade 
unionism, an exemplar of a broader European minority trend towards ‘radicalised political 
unionism’ (Upchurch, Taylor and Mathers: 2009), this chapter explores both: (a) the RMT’s 
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strike mobilisation activity; and (b) its left-wing political orientation and identity. In the 
process, it focuses attention on the connecting feature between this industrial and political 
militancy, namely the role of left-wing union activists and the ‘political congruence’ 
(Upchurch, Flynn and Croucher, 2008) that exists between leaders, activists and members 
within the union. Finally, in contextualising the RMT’s highly militant and politicised 
unionism in terms of the broader UK context and recent public sector strikes against 
austerity, it assesses the potential for its further extension and development. The article 
draws on extensive empirical research conducted over recent years (Darlington, 2009a; 
2009b; 2010; 2012; Connolly and Darlington, 2012), involving semi-structured interviews 
with a range of union informants within both unions, analysis of documentary material, and 
personal fieldwork observation. 
 
Strike Mobilisation 
Over the last 10 years the RMT’s ‘brand image’ has essentially been that of a striking union. 
For example, on London Underground between January 2002 and December 2012 the union 
balloted in favour of industrial action on at least 87 different occasions, with ballots leading 
to strikes (usually of 24 hours, sometimes 48 hours, and occasionally 72-hours duration) on 
41 different occasions, resulting in a total of 72 full days of strike action overall. On the 
national railway network during the same period the union balloted in favour of industrial 
action on at least 131 different occasions, with ballots leading to strikes on 54 different 
occasions, resulting in a total of 176 full days of strike action overall. In the two industries 
combined this represented a total of at least 218 ballots, 95 of which led to strikes, resulting 
in a total of 248 full days of strike action overall. Per thousand members, the RMT has 
probably organised more ballots for industrial action, secured ‘yes’ votes in such ballots, and 
then taken more strike action than any other union in Britain over recent years. 
Significantly, almost every single one of the union’s ballots on the Underground and the 
railways during the period 2002-09 returned overwhelming majorities in favour of action, 
with a mean of 83 per cent. The proportion of union members participating in such ballots 
was also creditable with a mean of 39 per cent on the Underground and 66 per cent on the 
railways (Darlington, 2010).  
Frequently such ballot results have merely been used to bolster the union’s 
bargaining leverage, with no action resulting, although sometimes with significant 
concessions being extracted. For example, on the railways the threat of 24-hour and 48-
hour strikes by 7,000 Network Rail guards, signals and maintenance staff in June 2004 
forced a climb down from a proposed plan to close a final-salary pension scheme for new 
starters. On occasions RMT strike threats have led to full-blown strike action, sometimes 
with devastatingly high-profile public effect. For example, a 72-hour strike by 2,300 
privatised Metronet maintenance workers on the London Underground in September 2007 
wiped out the vast majority of the Tube network, inconvenienced 3 million people and 
caused an estimated £100m damage to London’s economy.  
There have been a number of notable characteristic features of RMT strike activity 
on the railways and Underground. First, the tactic of ‘discontinuous action’, a single or a 
series of 24-hour or 48-hour strikes (and on occasion 72-hour) rather than indefinite strike 
action has been the common currency of the RMT, albeit sometime such discontinuous 
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action has been highly repetitive (for example, three 48 hour strikes at National Express East 
Anglia in 2009 and fourteen successive 24-hour Sunday strikes at Virgin Cross Country in 
2006). While such strike activity has limited the cost to union members in terms of loss of 
earnings, in such a strategically important industrial context (unlike many other industries) 
where there is often effectively a non-substitutable service, such limited action has also 
often been financially highly damaging to the employer because it has been so effective in 
disrupting service delivery.  
 
Second, the number of union members involved in strike activity has varied 
considerably. On the London Underground, while some disputes have been local walk-outs 
on individual tube lines involving less than 100 RMT members (for example, a strike in 2003 
by 80 train drivers led to the loss of 28 peak-time trains and effectively closed the 
Hammersmith and City Line), there have also been numerous network-wide strikes involving 
the bulk of the RMT’s members (for example, in 2010 there were four 24-hour strikes 
involving 9,300 RMT members). Similarly on the railways, strikes have sometimes involved 
relatively small numbers of workers usually employed by individual companies (such as 550 
on Central Trains in 2005 or 2,000 on South West Trains in 2003), but again strike ballots 
and/or strikes have also involved much more substantial numbers (for example, 12,000 in 
Network Rail in 2008). On occasion within both sectors the RMT has attempted to 
coordinate a number of different individual strikes: in 2003 organising strike action by 4,300 
guards across nine different railway companies, and in 2008 coinciding seven separate 
Underground strikes by different groups of workers employed by a variety of companies. 
 
Third, a wide range of occupational groups of RMT members have been involved in 
such strike action, not merely strategically powerful groups such as train drivers, signal staff 
and engineering and maintenance workers, but also less much less well organised groups 
such as guards and station staff, as well as poorly paid and vulnerable cleaning and catering 
staff. For example, during June-August 2008 about 700 RMT cleaners (including many 
migrants) working for four private contractors on the Underground engaged in one 24-hour 
strike and one 48-hour strike on the issue of a ‘living wage’. Meanwhile, while some strikes 
in both rail and Underground sectors have involved merely a single grade of workers (for 
example, conductors on London Midland in 2009), often they have embraced two or more 
grades (such as conductors, station and clerical staff on Central Trains in 2006). 
Fourth, compared with another relatively strike-prone industry over the period of 
the last 15 years, the Royal Mail, there has been little unofficial strike action on the railways 
and Underground in terms of RMT members engaging in action independently of and/or 
against the wishes of national union officers. Instead the vast majority of strike activity has 
been granted official union support and been subject to formal balloting procedures. But 
rather than such strike activity merely being initiated and led from above by the official 
union leadership, the pressure for ballots/strikes has often come from local reps and 
members, transmitted to union branch meetings and then generalised and given official 
approval at regional and national union level.  
Fifth, picketing of railway and Underground stations (and sometimes train depots) 
has been a common practice, with the regular presence of the union’s leading officers on 
picket lines helping to legitimise such activity and embed it as part of the culture of strike 
activity. While such picketing has primarily involved merely union reps and activists, in a 
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context in which there has invariably been widespread membership respect for strike 
decisions, it has taken the form more of a public relations and union confidence-building 
exercise than an attempt to persuade colleagues to refrain from going into work.  
Sixth, secondary and solidarity action have not been uncommon. For example, the 
impact of the 2007 Metronet engineering strike was undoubtedly bolstered by the solidarity 
action displayed by train drivers and station staff on the operational side of the 
Underground, whose threat of refusing to work on affected lines on the basis of safety 
concerns obliged the employers to close down most of the network. In addition solidarity 
action for external causes was vividly illustrated on the Underground in 2002 when, despite 
threats of legal action against the union, significant numbers of RMT members engaged in 
stoppages of work in support of strike action being taken by the Fire Brigades Union, 
including drivers who refused to take trains out of depots on the formal basis that the 
network would be unsafe without professional fire cover. 
Seventh, many strikes have tended to be relatively ‘political’. On the railways this has 
been because the all pervasive neoliberal project has shaped the discourse and policy of 
successive Conservative, Labour and coalition governments, thereby making the political 
demand for re-nationalisation an underlying feature of the RMT’s strike mobilisation 
approach, as well as because of the specific role of government in awarding franchises to 
private companies, subsidising the industry with public funds, and because a series of 
accidents have made health and safety a political issue. Likewise the overall public 
ownership and management of the Underground, with the directly-elected Mayor of 
London’s over-arching powerful influence, as well as the union’s vigorous opposition to 
part-privatisation and its political campaign for the transfer of work back to the public 
sector, have made strikes in the capital highly political. In addition, in both sectors there has 
also been the persistent use by employers of the government’s employment legislation to 
get industrial action ballots declared invalid and strike action called off on the basis that the 
proposed action was unlawful. 
While many commentators have dismissed the RMT’s militant trade union model as 
being outmoded, destructive and self-defeating in the 21st century world of transformed 
work and employment relations (Coats, 2005; Roche and Geary, 2006), the union has been 
able to claim several high-profile bargaining victories and advances for union organisation, 
even since the onset of financial recession in 2009. Indeed through the threat and/or use of 
strike action the RMT provided verifiable evidence of its ability to force concessions from 
employers resulting in the defence/delivery of material improvements in their members’ 
pay and conditions of work (Darlington, 2009a; 2009b; 2012). This included winning 
numerous above-inflation pay rises, as well as the 35-hour working week on many different 
sections of the railway network and London Underground; reversing managerial decisions to 
dismiss individually targeted active union members and reps (2011); preventing attempts by 
Network Rail (2004) and other rail companies (2006) to end final salary pension schemes for 
new starters; contributing to bringing the return of infrastructure maintenance in-house in 
Network Rail (2003); and forcing Transport for London to agree to bring back in-house the 
failed Metronet Public Private Partnership (PPP) contract (2007).  
Moreover during 2002-09 the RMT not only stemmed the relentless decline in 
membership it previously experienced in the 1980s and 1990s, but also, unlike many other 
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UK unions, recruited many new members. Membership in the London Transport Region 
increased from 9,457 to 13,570 during the period 2002-2009 (or 43 per cent), and across the 
union as a whole over the same period increased from 63,084 to 79,499 (or 26 per cent). 
Even though the absolute numbers are not large, the RMT became one of the fastest 
growing unions in Britain and compared favourably within a context of merely stable or 
even declining membership for many others (Darlington, 2010). 
Despite the fact membership levels reduced marginally over the period 2010-11 
amidst the austerity offensive, the union has managed to continue to make new inroads 
into new areas of employment (for example, signing up new recognition agreements for 
cleaners at Tyne and Wear Metro in 2011). In addition, the RMT’s industrial militancy 
energised a wide layer of reps and activists, boosted the self-confidence of union members 
and their sense of collective power generally, and contributed to the development of 
relative vibrant forms of workplace union organisation in many areas. As one union rep 
explained: ‘Collectively we can achieve more through militancy, it follows through: the 
mobilisation works, militancy works, organisation works, and it gives people strength, the 
confidence that they can achieve things’. As a result, there was a direct relationship (or 
‘virtuous circle’) between the unions’ strike mobilisation and its effectiveness in obtaining 
bargaining gains, membership growth and union revitalisation. 
Yet notwithstanding the successes of the militant approach adopted by the RMT, 
there were also some important limitations and challenges. Strikes were necessarily ‘high-
risk’ and a successful outcome far from certain, with ineffectiveness/failure weakening 
union organisation, undermining morale and resulting in some membership loss. There was 
the problem of employers’ counter-mobilisation, including occasional attempts to utilise 
strike-breaking managers and agency staff to undermine their impact. There were 
discernible differences between different occupational groups of RMT members (for 
example, between train drivers and station staff) in terms of potential industrial muscle, 
strength of workplace union organisation and willingness to engage in strike activity, as well 
as considerable variation in the strength of union organisation between individual 
companies. There were inter-union rivalries, mainly with rival drivers’ union ASLEF, which 
also sometimes undermined action. Finally the onset of economic recession in 2008 and 
implementation of government budget deficit measures, with its accentuated threat of job 
loss, also posed rather more formidable challenges for RMT organisation and the defence of 
members’ jobs and conditions (Connolly and Darlington, 2012). 
 
Left-Wing Political Orientation and Identity 
The RMT’s industrial militancy has been more than matched by left-wing political opposition 
to employers’ and government policies and the development of a clear anti-neoliberal 
identity. To begin with, there was the decision to break its historic link with the Labour 
Party. Historically the RMT (and its predecessor union, the NUR) leadership had always been 
proud of the union’s strong links with the Labour Party, a significant number of union 
activists were Labour councillors, and at the grassroots the union boasted the highest 
density of Labour Party membership of any trade union proportionate to its size. But after 
the election of Tony Blair’s government in 1997, the union became a fierce critic of the 
perceived ‘neoliberalism’ of ‘New’ Labour, notably its refusal to countenance re-
7 
 
nationalisation of the railways, its implementation of part-privatisation of the London 
Underground, retention of the Conservatives’ ‘anti-union’ employment legislation, 
widespread moves towards the marketisation of public services, and military intervention in 
Iraq. After reducing affiliation fees to the Labour Party for allegedly ‘deserting its working 
class roots’ and ‘jumping into bed with its big business friends’, the RMT allowed local union 
branches and regions to affiliate to and campaign for non-Labour Party political 
organisations and candidates at local and parliamentary elections.  
In the Greater London Assembly elections of 2000 ten RMT London Underground 
workers, led by Pat Sikorski (newly elected as Assistant General Secretary), ran as 
candidates as part of the RMT London Region’s Campaign Against Tube Privatisation, in the 
process gaining 17,000 votes. This was followed by the RMT national executive’s decision to 
allow five Scottish branches and its Scottish Regional Council to affiliate to the Scottish 
Socialist Party, after which Labour’s national executive committee recommended the RMT 
‘be treated as disaffiliated from this Party forthwith’. An RMT special general meeting in 
February 2004 refused to be ‘bullied’ and overwhelmingly decided to reaffirm its policy of 
supporting other political organisations that reflected union policies.  
Over the next few years the RMT hosted two national conferences open to trade 
activists from others unions to discuss ‘The Crisis in Working Class Political Representation’ 
which made clear the gulf between the union and New Labour. Bob Crow cited the Labour 
government’s continuing obsession with privatisation and its refusal to scrap anti-union 
laws as evidence that the party no longer acted for working men and women. At the union’s 
2007 Annual General Meeting (AGM) he delivered a damning indictment of Labour and 
scorned the possibility of resurrecting it as a workers’ party: ‘Any hope of the Labour Party 
working for workers is dead, finished, over. I think all of you who are staying in the Labour 
Party are just giving credibility to it’. He warned: ‘We will have to look to find another route 
for political representation’. But while underlining the need for the union to have a working 
class political alternative to Labour the manner in which that might come about was left 
open to debate inside the union, with no real consensus emerging, even amongst the left. 
Ironically the RMT national executive proceeded to expand and reinvigorate the RMT’s 
parliamentary Labour Party group (now with 23 MPs), headed by left-wing MP John 
McDonnell, and subsequently back McDonnell’s 2007 campaign for the Labour Party 
leadership.  
However, even though they refused to commit the union to launching a new 
independent broad-based left-wing political party, individual regions and branches of the 
union were allowed to support candidates from alternative political parties or organisations 
to Labour, with Bob Crow personally identifying himself with those socialist candidates who 
did so. Thus, in 2008 many of the RMT’s London branches supported the radical Left List 
mayoral candidate (and Stop the War convenor) Lindsay German. In the general election of 
2010, and local council elections of 2011 and 2012, RMT branches around the country 
supported independent candidates, including Alex Gordon, RMT President, and other 
leading union figures in Liverpool, Salford, Portsmouth and Doncaster, who stood as part of 
an alternative ‘Trade Unionist and Socialist Coalition’ (on whose steering committee Bob 
Crow served in a personal capacity) around the platform of ‘No to Cuts and Privatisation! 
Make the Bosses Pay!’, public ownership and control of the major utilities, repeal of anti-
union laws, and withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. For the June 2009 European 
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elections, the RMT set up a ‘No2EU - Yes to Democracy’ electoral coalition (again including 
leading members of the RMT across the country) on a platform of opposition to the Lisbon 
Treaty and EU-led liberalisation of public services.  
Meanwhile the RMT opposed the government’s military intervention in Iraq and 
officially supported the ‘Stop the War’ movement of opposition. Across the country 
individual regions and branches, including the union’s AGM, endorsed this stance. Likewise 
the London Transport Regional Council, with a policy of calling for the withdrawal of British 
troops, mobilised dozens of members for the mammoth 15 February 2003 anti-war 
demonstration. Immediately after the 7 July 2005 London bombings Bob Crow explained: 
‘The war Tony Blair led us into in Iraq was a criminal act… and…has now resulted in the very 
escalation of violence that we warned of’ (Across the Tracks, July 2005). In the immediate 
hours after the 21 July 2005 attempted repeat bombings, leading RMT reps on the 
Underground backed dozens of their members who refused to drive trains or open up 
stations as requested to do so by the government and employers. Although the action was 
framed around the issue of safety, the RMT’s stance was clearly informed by an explicit left-
wing political set of assumptions related to opposition to the war in Iraq.  
More generally the RMT took some important steps to broaden the agenda of trade 
unionism by linking workplace issues to social and political concerns and making common 
cause with a range of social movements. This was manifest in a number of ways. Thus the 
threat of substantial job losses on both the railways and Underground led the union to 
attempt to connect industrial militancy aimed at safeguarding its members’ jobs and 
conditions, on the one hand, with the resulting threat of cuts in the quality and availability 
of services itself, on the other, thereby developing alliances with service users. For example, 
the union joined with a ‘Bring Back British Rail’ internet-based campaign which linked rail 
passengers and employees in calling for the renationalisation of private rail companies and a 
newly unified national rail network ‘run for people not profit’. Likewise links were 
established with the ‘Campaign for Better Transport’ which opposed rail fare increases for 
passengers and campaigned for improved public transport and a reduction in the 
contribution of transport to climate change.  
The RMT also supported a number of broad based industrial and political campaigns. 
It maintained close links with other railway and transport unions affiliated to the European 
Transport Workers’ Federation, as well as other unions such as the radical SUD-Rail in 
France, and mobilised several hundreds of its activists and members for a number of 
different European-wide demonstrations against EU liberalisation of the rail sector. It took 
the initiative to sponsor the launch of a National Shop Stewards’ Network, both as a means 
of building links with militant trade unionists in other industries and for revitalising the 
grassroots of the unions so as to build a combative union movement in Britain; in the 
process Crow and other leading RMT activists participated in a number of lively national 
conferences of hundreds of workplace reps/activists, and regional meetings, and helped to 
generate solidarity for different workers’ disputes. In this respect, the RMT played a notably 
prominent role in supporting a 2009 workers’ occupation at the Vestas wind turbine plant 
on the Isle of Wight in an imaginative and high-profile battle for ‘green’ jobs and renewable 
energy policy.  
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In addition, the union consistently took initiatives to encourage their members to act 
in solidarity with other struggles taking place. For example, in 2010 it wrote to all its 
branches and directly emailed/texted members urging them to join a national student 
demonstration against government imposition of increased tuition fees. In London in 2011 it 
mobilised its members to join picket lines of striking electricians protesting against private 
contractors’ attempts to introduce pay cuts. Likewise the union supported the global justice 
and anti-capitalist movement, with London Regional Council participation at the European 
Social Forums in Florence, 2002, Paris 2003 and London 2004, and World Social Forum in 
Brazil. Significantly, unlike virtually every other union in Britain, the RMT retained in its 
rulebook the objective: ‘to work for the supersession of the capitalist system by a socialistic 
order of society’.  
Mcllroy (2012) has argued that the RMT’s political initiatives have failed to engage 
substantial numbers of members and have infrequently impacted on mainstream union 
activity, with the RMT subsisting to a degree organisationally and politically within the orbit 
of Labourism and failing to evolve as a distinctive, oppositional political entity. Nonetheless 
such initiatives have been well supported by key national figures within the union as well as 
a sizeable layer of left activists at different levels of the RMT across the country, and they 
mark a notable, if as yet tentative and limited, attempt to reorient the union as a social 
actor towards a broader political agenda and seek new forms of political representation. 
 
Reciprocal Linkage  
Clearly there have been some important broad environment factors which help to explain 
the development of the RMT’s militant and left-wing political model of trade unionism. The 
political economy context of both the railway and Underground sectors has clearly been 
important not only in contributing to the broad industrial discontent, but also in terms of 
the politicisation of industrial relations and trade unionism that has occurred. Thus the 
impact of privatisation (with the transformation of relatively well-functioning integrated 
rail/tube networks into highly fragmented businesses involving widely different collective 
bargaining arrangements and terms and conditions of employment) resulted in 
organisational restructuring, growing levels of employment insecurity, and constant 
managerial attempts to change working arrangements in ways which were perceived as 
detrimental to workers’ interests. In turn this encouraged workers’ discontent and its 
manifestation in militant forms of strike mobilisation and left-wing political union 
orientation and leadership. 
The specific sectoral contexts that have placed the RMT and its members in an 
unusually strong bargaining position and lent feasibility to the strike mobilisation approach 
adopted also needs to be fully taken into account. The operational vulnerability of both the 
railway and Underground systems to strike action, with their tightly integrated service 
networks which are not easily substitutable by other means, and the RMT’s strategic 
position both industrially and within society more generally, has obviously provided it with 
enormous potential bargaining power in which strikes, or even the threat of them, can have 
a much greater and immediate impact than in many other industrial sectors. The   
homogeneity of a large predominantly manual workforce with a strong occupational 
identity and relatively high union membership density also contributed to creating a 
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favourable environment for RMT members to engage in strike activity compared with the 
more subdued union response in other industries in recent years.  
But all of these objective factors do not in themselves provide a sufficient 
explanation for the strike mobilisation that occurred, nor left-wing political form of trade 
unionism that developed: such an outcome also had to be constructed by the role of 
subjective agency. Thus also crucially important was that most of the union’s national and 
regional officers, and a significant number of local reps and activists held fairly explicit left-
wing political values, ideology, motivation and commitment, and from the early 2000s 
exercised considerable industrial and political influence in shaping the union’s approach.  
Such a left-wing tradition developed in part from the historical legacy of a grassroots 
unofficial caucus, the Campaign for Fighting and Democratic Union, that operated in the late 
1980s and 1990s and sought to overhaul the union’s internal democratic structures, 
challenge the moderate industrial and political leadership of the incumbent general 
secretary, and rebuild the strength of the union through the organisation of militant 
collective struggle. Embracing some 300 leading union officers, lay reps and activists, the 
group produced a regular newsletter, organised periodic meetings and increasingly played 
an influential role in national disputes, and eventually helped to secure a huge majority in 
support of Crow’s election as general secretary in 2002 on a platform of creating a ‘fighting 
trade union’.  
Previously a member of the Communist Party (13 years) and national executive 
member of the Socialist Labour Party (3 years), Crow retained his radical left politics, and his 
vociferous (and high-profile media) antagonism towards the employers and government, 
willingness to support strikes, and persistent stress on the virtues of militant resistance, 
collectivism and solidarity, undoubtedly contributed to the high levels of union mobilisation. 
As one Underground union activist noted: 
Since his election victory [in 2002] Bob Crow has taken a lead in encouraging a fighting trade union 
platform, supporting strike action where necessary, refuting social partnership, and breaking with the 
Labour Party, and so on…we had a figurehead who…wanted to take on the employers, who would 
actively encourage it. He would look at reasons to go into dispute rather than reasons not to. 
In the early 2000s there were a succession of further electoral victories which led to 
the left’s ascendancy on the national executive, and although the RMT no longer had any 
formally organised broad left grouping as such it retained a wide but loose network of 
prominent left-wing officers and reps that became increasingly influential in the union’s 
industrial and political mobilisation. The political composition of the RMT’s London 
Transport Regional Council illustrated the process in sharp relief. On the one hand, a 
number of far left organisations (such as the Socialist Workers Party) had representation, 
with some other individuals although no longer a formal member of a political party, also 
remaining highly political in their overall approach. On the other hand there was a 
‘syndicalist left’ element composed of a broad mix of industrial militants, most of whom 
(like their party and ex-party counterparts) also adopted a consistently adversarial approach 
to management and the government and necessarily also took up political arguments 
(Darlington, 2009a; 2009b).  
This was important because such left-wing leadership played a key role in helping to 
encourage the union’s strike mobilisation approach. Thus the process of building members 
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support for strike ballots provided an important focus for this relatively large milieu of  
combative workplace union reps and activists to engage in ‘collective action framing’ (Snow 
et al, 1986) and ‘repertoires of contention’ (McAdam et al, 2001) via a variety of propaganda 
communication channels (such as section/mass meetings and regular company/grade/union 
branch newsletters, leaflets, emails and text messages) so as to ‘mobilise bias’ (Batstone et 
al, 1978) in an adversarial direction. In articulating workers’ sense of injustice and targeting 
it at employers and the government, and advocating the need the need for strike action as 
an effective means of collective redress, this vibrant network of left-wing reps/activists 
displayed crucial leadership and organisational skills that made workers more likely and 
more willing to engage in strike mobilisation. 
But it was also important because they provided an intensely ideological and political 
cutting-edge to such industrial militancy. Such left-wing leaders and activists were 
motivated not just by a struggle against perceived workplace injustice, but also by the 
search for social justice outside the workplace, often framing issues with a highly political 
discourse that encompassed a broader and more political set of concerns pivoted on a 
traditional class-based analysis of society and the need to defend the interests of the wider 
working class movement (‘us’) in response to employers and the government (‘them’). In 
seeking to shape its identity as a ‘fighting union’, there was the constant emphasis on the 
need for ‘struggle’ to politically resist the whole process of privatisation and neoliberalism 
more generally. Thus left-wing leadership was an important contributory catalyst, symptom 
and beneficiary of strike mobilisation and the union’s strategic orientation and identity. 
Moreover, the left inside the RMT was not only more influential and less divided internally 
than in other unions, but also faces much less of a challenge from moderate or right-wing 
organised forces, which were negligible. 
It appears to provide some credence to the notion of a ‘political congruence’ 
(Upchurch et al, 2008), a convergence of shared political frames of reference, collective 
identity, expectations and intended outcomes between left-wing union leaders, activists and 
a critical mass of members, who were able to work together to a sufficient degree that it 
acted to subdue the inherent bureaucratic cleavages between paid full-time officials and 
activists/members that in other circumstances tend to be much more pronounced between 
these two groups. Contributing to such political congruence was the institution of a highly 
democratic form of union structure and organisation that occurred in the wake of Crow’s 
election. This resulted in the election (rather than appointment) of all national and regional 
paid union officials (who are subject to re-election after five years), a directly elected 
Council of Executives (whose members must relinquish their post after three-year terms of 
office), and central decision-making powers lying in the hands of lay national grade 
conferences and the AGM (with delegates excluded from attending for more than a three-
year successive period). In addition, the strike mobilisation approach and the left-wing 
politically-informed objectives that crystallised membership anti-government sentiments 
also encouraged democratic processes, and in turn helped to shape membership 
attachment/participation.  
Undoubtedly there is a question mark over the extent to which the broader mass of 
members of the RMT, as opposed to the minority of reps/activists, were politicised, on 
which there needs to be further research.  But even if RMT left-wing activists were ‘ahead’ 
of the vast majority of their members in ‘class-consciousness’ terms, their political views 
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appeared to chime with and not contradict the broad thrust of their members’ industrial 
perspectives, and received no real opposition.  
 
Broader Assessment 
The experience of the RMT over recent years provides clear evidence of a direct relationship 
between union militancy, effectiveness in ‘delivering’ collective bargaining gains, 
membership growth and the development of relatively vibrant forms of union organisation 
and representation. Such an adversarial stance, and the benefits it has bestowed, contrasts 
with the more accommodative forms of unionism adopted by many other unions which 
have often not been as successful.  
 Of course, notwithstanding the RMT’s achievements, the union is very small in 
number and the militant and left-wing political model of trade unionism it has embodied 
remains a distinct minority phenomenon within the UK. This raises the inevitable issue of 
the specificity of the case study evidence and the question of whether the experience of the 
RMT confirms the view of those industrial relations academics (Metcalf, 2005; Mcllroy and 
Daniels, 2009; Simms and Charlwood, 2010) who have argued that unfavourable broader 
societal economic and political constraints have severely limited the scope for union 
revitalisation in Britain. Certainly it was the relatively favourable ‘opportunity structure’ 
context that has placed the RMT and its members in an unusually strong bargaining position 
and thereby lent feasibility to the strike mobilisation adopted. Combined with strong levels 
of workplace union membership and organisation, it helped to explain the willingness to 
engage in strike activity, compared with the more subdued union response in many other 
industries in recent years. In other words, it could be argued the case study evidence 
presents an idiosyncratic sector and union. The implication is that such union militancy is 
unlikely to be replicable, or be as successfully implemented, by other unions that operate in 
less favourable arenas of employment in the UK where bargaining leverage and union 
organisation is much weaker.  
Nonetheless the fact that there has been extensive strike mobilisation in recent 
years within an area of employment like the civil service, which does not enjoy particularly 
favourable bargaining leverage, but which has a highly politicised industrial relations 
environment and left-wing leadership at every level of the union (Upchurch et al, 2008), at 
the very least suggests the potential basis for such radical political unionism may not 
necessarily be entirely unique. Thus McCarthy’s (2009) study of PCS within the Department 
for Work and Pensions, where the workforce engaged in nine days of strike action over a 29-
month period between 2006-8, found a significant positive association between 
mobilisation and collective action to gain improved bargaining outcomes (over pay and job 
cuts) and increased short-term ‘surges’ in union membership recruitment. During 2000-
2008 across the civil service as a whole, PCS’s emphasis on the importance of mobilisation 
and strike action (accounting for several million working days not worked), both as a means 
of defending members and of union building generally, appeared to contribute to a 
consistent annual growth in membership, which rose by 20 per cent. 
Arguably such evidence suggests unions do not have to be little more than victims of 
external changes wrought by neoliberal globalisation. While the revitalisation of the trade 
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union movement generally in Britain can only come through mass struggle from below, that 
does not mean there are not things that could be done in different employment sectors to 
maximise the potential opportunities that the current protracted ‘Age of Austerity’ context, 
with its significant increase in the level of union militancy after many years of relative labour 
quiescence, throws up. The RMT’s left-wing radical unionism provides an important 
alternative model to mainstream approaches, both as a means of defending members and 
rebuilding union organisation. 
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